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NOTES
This may be accomplished by a direct overruling of the Wolf case
through a holding that the exclusion of evidence is an essential in-
gredient of the right of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment.105 Without directly overruling Wolf, the Court could re-
examine the scope of the due process clause and include within it a
bar to the use of illegally obtained evidence. Since "basic rights do
not become petrified as of any one time," 106 and since "it is of the
very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what
is deemed reasonable and right," 107 this solution is not without
justification.
But the "national" protection of the right of privacy by the ex-
clusion of evidence may require a departure from the sources tapped
in previous investigations of the problem. In this connection, the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment may
provide a fertile field for future consideration. Assuming that the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in federal courts is a privilege
afforded every citizen of the United States, an argument could be
made that the admission of such evidence in state courts is an un-
constitutional abridgement of that privilege. Since other remedies do
not appear to provide adequate protection, the imposition of the
exclusionary rule on the state level would seem to be necessary.
X
TiiE HOOVER REPORT- PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN REQUIRED
ADmINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
One of the most pressing problems in administrative law is that
of procedural due process in administrative hearings. The remedial
Administrative Procedure Act 2 has provided only a limited solution.3
105 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928) (dictum) ;
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1948) (dissenting opinion). See also
MACHEN, The Law Of Search And Seizure, in LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 144(1950).10 See Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 105 at 27.
107 Ibid.
I See GEULHORN AND BysF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 715-22 (1954) ; ATTORNEY
GENERAL, MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Act 6 (1947); Com-
MISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
REPORT To THE CONGRESS ON LEGAL SERvIcEs AND PROCEDURE 45-46 (1955)(hereinafter referred to as COMMISSION REPORT).
260 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1952).
3 See CONMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERvicEs AND PROCEDURE 137-43
(1955) (hereinafter referred to as TASK FORCE REPORT). Schwartz, The Ad-
ininistrative Procedure Act In Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1173 (1954).
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This fact was emphasized by the appointment of the Hoover Commis-
sion to study legal services and procedure in the executive branch of
the federal government. 4  Mr. Hoover stated, in addressing the Task
Force. that "there is no field in the whole government that so sorely
needs remedies as the field you will study." 5 Because of the wide
scope of "due process" it will be dealt with solely in relation to re-
quired adjudicatory hearings within administrative agencies. The
Hoover Report will also be considered and evaluated in the light of
present law.
Due Process
Procedural due process by its very nature is difficult to define.
Justice Brandeis, in explaining it, has said:
The inexorable safeguard which the due process clause assures is not that a
court may examine whether the findings . . . are correct, but that the trier
of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal; that no finding shall be made except
upon due notice and opportunity to be heard; that the procedure at the hearing
shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial; and that it shall be con-
ducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for a court to determine
whether the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed. 6
The right to a fair hearing 7 of which Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke,
presents a major difficulty in determining whether procedural due
process has been accorded in an administrative hearing.8
Separation of Functions
Many of the objections that a hearing is not conducted in ac-
cordance with procedural due process arise because of the lack of
"separation of functions." The problem arises when one agency is at
once the investigating, prosecuting and judging instrumentality. This
combination of functions appears not only in a particular agency as a
whole, but often, an individual is at once both prosecutor and judge.9
4 There are two reports, the Task Force Report and the Commission Report.
The first was written by a committee of the Hoover Commission, and is merely
a recommendation to the Commission. The second is the report of the Com-
mission itself to Congress. The Commission adopted, in substance, all of the
Task Force's recommendations not dealing directly with amendments to the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Schwartz, Sunmar~v of the Reports in
Symposiumz: Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports on Legal Services
and Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1270, 1272 (1955).
5 TAsK FORCE: REPORT 1.
6 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
7 Iowa Cent. Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896) (dictum) ; see GELLHORN,
AND BYSE, ADMixxsTRATivE LAW 722 (1954); SCHWARTZ, AMERICA,; ADMIN-
ISTRATIvE LAW 70 (1950).8 See GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADmINISTRATIvE LAW 715-22 (1954).
9 See DAVIs, ADMniISTRATIvE LAW § 118. at 390 (1951).
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It has been said that an agency, in its infancy, may necessarily com-
bine all three tasks in order to explore the field of its activity. As it
matures, however, the functions should be separated in order to do
away with the danger of omnipotence.' 0 The separation of these func-
tions may be accomplished by internal limitations or the separation
may be complete. In the first instance, judging is separated from
"inconsistent functions" within the agency itself." In the second case,
the agency is divided into two completely divorced parts.' 2  One is
composed of the investigating and prosecuting division, while the other
is the judging division.' 3
That this combination of functions within one agency is a serious
threat to the procedural due process demanded by the Constitution
cannot be denied. It is also a violation of the maxim that "no man
shall be a judge in his own cause." 14 Section 5(c) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act provides for internal separation of functions,15
and is applicable "in every case of adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing." 16 Procedure in the Immigration Service is an excellent
illustration of the evils intended to be corrected by this section. In
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,'7 a Chinese alien contended in a habeas
corpus proceeding that the deportation hearing afforded him did not
comply with the provisions of Section 5(c). The hearing was con-
ducted before an inspector, and although this "inspector" did not con-
duct the investigation, it was his function to investigate similar cases.'
The Government argued that Section 5 did not apply since the hear-
ing was not an "adjudication required by statute." 19 The Court held
that the immigration hearing, although not specifically required in the
enabling act,20 was necessary because:
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process . . . permeates every
valid enactment.
10 See VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 92 (1953).
11 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 125 (1951).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 ".. . [A] liquis non debet esse Judex in propria causa .... Dr. Bonham's
Case, 8 Co. 113b, l18a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610).
'560 STAT. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
it1d. at 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
17 339 U.S. 33, modified on imotion, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
is The immigrant inspector, for purposes of the hearing, is called the
"presiding inspector." An examining inspector may be designated to hold the
hearing, but none was appointed in this case. The presiding inspector may have
investigated a very similar case immediately before being appointed to hear a
case. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47, modified an mnotion.
339 U.S. 908 (1950).
1960 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1004 (1952).
20 39 STAT. 889 (1917).
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* * **We do not think the limiting words render the Administrative
Procedure Act inapplicable to hearings, the requirement for which has been
read into a statute by the Court in order to save the statute from invalidity.
21
In addition, the inspector was required to cross-examine the alien's
witnesses, and to present the evidence necessary to support the charges
against the alien. Mr. Justice Jackson said for the majority that,
the inspector's duties include investigation of like cases; and
while he is today hearing cases investigated by a colleague, tomorrow
his investigation of a case may be heard before the inspector whose
case he passes on today." 22 It is to be noted that Congress, six months
later, overruled this decision by the passage of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act,23, which specifically exempted deportation pro-
ceedings from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
This of course permits a recurrence of the Wong Yang Sung situa-
tion.24 Thus the provisions of Section 5 (c), which are applicable only
when the enabling act requires a hearing on the record, or where this
requirement is read into the particular statute by the courts,25 is too
narrow in scope to provide the answer to the problem of combined
functions.28
Consideration of the applicability of the Administrative Procedure
Act aside, where functions are combined as they were in the Wong
Yang Sung case due process is not afforded the individual. In
Marcello v. Bonds,2 7 another deportation proceeding, the special in-
quiry officer who heard the case was under the supervision of the
investigative and prosecuting officials of the Immigration Service.
Petitioner contended that he had been deprived of due process because
of this control. The Court ruled, in effect, that the contention was
without merit considerirng that this type of hearing was standard pro-
cedure in the Immigration Service and had judicial approval. This
argument is employed to rebut the constitutional argument whenever
it is raised. The prevailing thought seems to be that "the concentra-
tion of functions has become too firmly established in the administra-
tive process to be" attacked constitutionally. 28 However, it is an
21 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra note 18 at 49-50.
22 Id. at 45.
2364 STAT. 1048 (1950). In 1952 the provisions of this act were repealed,
but re-effectuated, by the McCarran Act. 66 STAT. 210, 280 (1952), 8 U.S.C.§ 1252 (1952). See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
24 Cf. United States v. Kenton, 224 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1955). But see
Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 346
U.S. 929 (1954).
u See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified on motion, 339
U.S. 908 (1950); DAVis, ADMINisTRATIV LAW § 133, at 429-30 (1951).
26 See TAsx FORCE REPORT 182; DAVIs, ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW § 133, at 425.
It is to be noted that Section 5(c) does not apply where the head of an agency
makes the decision. See Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act In
Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1173, 1212 (1954).
27 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
28 See, e.g., In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 86 A.2d 430, 436 (App. Div.
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established fact that the concentration of all governmental powers in
one instrumentality is violative of the concept of separation of powers
which is evidenced by the Constitution.2 9 Merely because the judiciary
has become conditioned over a long period of time to the concentration
of functions in administrative agencies is no reason why it should be
tolerated.
The Hoover Commission's answer to this problem is embodied in
three Recommendations."0 Recommendation No. 41 proposes that:
Internal separation of functions should be extended to all adjudicatory
proceedings, including the process of final decision by agency heads, aided by
special review staff or personnel.3 '
Adoption of the Recommendation would solve the problem presented
in both the Wong Yang Sung and Bonds cases. Basically what would
be accomplished is the insulation of the top-decision-making division
from any contact with the other departments of a particular agency.
The argument is advanced that when a case is decided, it is desirable
that the head of an agency have the expert advice of staff members
who have worked on the case below. 32 The Recommendation provides
for the establishment of a special review staff within an agency to
render expert advice to aid the agency head in coming to a final de-
cision. In this way, any necessity for contact with lower echelon
agency personnel, who worked on the case initially, is obviated. By
enacting this Recommendation into law, every agency, in cases of
formal adjudication, would be required to conform to the principle of
separation of functions.
Closely allied with this is Recommendation No. 66, 3 which deals
primarily with~the independence of hearing examiners. Although the
1952) (concurring opinion); Schwartz, Administrative Laz, 1955 Annual
Survey of American- Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 93, 104 (1956).
29 See VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 4-5 (1953).3o TASK FORCE REPORT 176 (Recommendation No. 41) ; Id. at 246 (Recom-
mendation No. 63); Id. at 257 (Recommendation No. 66). Recommendation
No. 63 deals with the establishment of an administrative court and will not be
dealt with here. It should be noted that many more of the Recommendations
deal to a certain extent with procedural due process, but also will not be treated
in this Note.
31 TASK FORCE REPORT 176.
32 See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 130, at 416 (1951). As to the advis-
ability of too much dependence on expert advice, here is the opinion of one
critic: ". . . special knowledge and the highly trained mind produce their own
limitations. . . Expertise, it may be argued, sacrifices the insight of common
sense to intensity of experience .... Too often, also, it lacks humility; and this
breeds in its possessors a failure in proportion which makes them fail to see
the obvious which is before their very noses. It has, also, a certain caste-spirit
about it, so that experts tend to neglect all evidence which does not come from
those who belong to their own ranks." Laski, The Limitations of the Expert,
162 Harper's Magazine 102 (1930).3 3 TASK FORCE REPORT 257.
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Administrative Procedure Act provides, to some extent, for their
independence, 34 that remedy has not been adequate.35 It is suggested
by the Task Force that:
Hearing examiners should be replaced by hearing commissioners appointed
by an authority other than the agency for which they conduct hearings; their
tenure, status, compensation, and removal should be fixed by law; and they
should be completely independent of the agencies whose cases they hear.3 6
A recent Supreme Court case 37 strikingly illustrates the need for a
remedy. Petitioner, appealing from an adverse decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals in a deportation hearing, alleged denial of a
fair hearing. It was claimed that the Board, directly under the super-
vision of the Attorney General, was influenced by the publication of a
list of individuals whom the Attorney General wished deported. The
Court rejected this contention, stating that it did not feel that "specu-
lation on the effect of subconscious psychological pressures provides
sufficient justification for" 38 upholding petitioner's contention. The
lower court had been of the opinion that the Board of Immigration
Appeals had been influenced by what was, in practical effect, an order
from a superior.3 9 The instant Recommendation would remedy this
evil. The Task Force suggests the designation of a chief hearing
commissioner with sole responsibility for the selection and control of
hearing examiners of all agencies. 40  Thus, the hearing examiners
would be almost completely out of the agency's control, thereby pre-
cluding any possibility of agency influence.4 ' It is felt that agency
control of examiners would "completely defeat the principle of inde-
pendence of judgment indispensable to administrative due process." 42
It is further suggested that the examiners' status be raised, by a sub-
stantial pay increase, in order to attract high calibre personnel who
34 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1952). "Subject to the civil-service
and other laws . . . there shall be appointed by and for each agency . . .
examiners . . . who . . . shall perform no duties inconsistent with their duties
and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the agency
in which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by
the Civil Service Commission .... ." Ibid. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial
Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
35 See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified on motion, 339 U.S. 908 (1950) ; United States
v. Kenton, 224 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1955).3 6 
TASK FORCE REPORT 257 (emphasis added).
3 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
38 Id. at 283.
39 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 77, 80-81 (2d
Cir.), reild, 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
40 See TASK FORCE REPORT 259.
41 The hearing examiners, or commissioners, as the Task Force calls them.
would still actually be employed by the various agencies. The chief hearing
commissioner would merely have primary responsibility for the selection and
supervision of the commissioners. He would select commissioners and appoint
them to various agencies. See TASK FORCE REPORT 264.
42 Id. at 258.
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NOTES
will inspire public confidence. This Recommendation, although not
calling for complete separation of functions, would seem to go far
toward insuring procedural due process. It is doubtful that an indi-
vidual's rights could adequately be protected when the prosecuting
and adjudicatory functions are both under the control of a particular
agency.
Bias
Bias has been defined as the propensity, or leaning, toward a
certain object or view. 43 It results indirectly from the combination of
functions in that there is agency control over the decision making
body of the organization. The result of this exercise of control, to a
certain extent, forces the policy of the agency or agency head on the
decision making body.44 Then too, the fact that a given hearing ex-
aminer's job depends at times upon the carrying out of agency policy,45
must influence his decision, even if only subconsciously. 46 Generally,
though, this type of bias has not been held to be fatal to a hearing.47
In NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co.48 the contention was advanced that
a fair hearing was not accorded in that the examiner was a zealous
advocate of the union, and that he uniformly found against the peti-
tioner on every factual issue. The Court stated that the total rejection
of one view cannot in and of itself impugn the integrity of the trier of
the facts.
Strong views on a particular controversial subject, as illustrated
in the fourth Morgan case,49 is another form of bias. That litigation
concerned rate-fixing orders promulgated by the Department of
Agriculture.5 0 It seems that the Secretary of Agriculture held very
definite views on the subject. The Supreme Court held that
". strong views on matters believed by him-to have been in issue,
did not unfit him for exercising his duty ...... 51
It has been said, in defense of this attitude, that single-mindedness
in carrying out the objectives of particular agencies is desirable, and
43 WFBSTERS' NEW INTmRNATIOxAL DICriONARY 262 (2d ed. 1946).
44 See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) ; Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co.,
337 U.S. 656 (1949) ; Fry Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 222 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1955) ;
United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Phelps,
136 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1943).
45 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 219 F.2d 77, 82 (2d
Cir.), rev'd, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); Schwartz, Administrative Law, 1955 Annual
Survey of American Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 93, 101 (1956).
46 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, supra note 45 at 80-81.
4 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949); United
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
4s337 U.S. 656 (1949).
49 See United States v. Morgan, mipra note 47 at 420-21 (1941); DAvis,
ADMINISTRAIrnE LAW § 111 (1951).
50 See United States v. Morgan, smtpra note 47 at 413.
5' United States v. Morgan, supra note 47 at 421.
1956]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that a judge under similar circumstances might possibly be influenced
in favor of the rights of owners of private property.52 But the basic
property rights of individuals are often subverted to the agencies' ends
in carrying out their objectives.55 The protection of these rights is
basic in our system of law.54 It is submitted that common-law judges
are not prejudiced in favor of private property rights, but are merely
aware of their great importance. Furthermore, the requirements of
due process are not adhered to when the main purpose of a particular
agency is to carry out its objectives without regard for property rights.
What is needed is a balance between the two conflicting demands.
Proof of personal bias on the other hand is fatal to any hearing.55
Personal bias means animosity toward a particular individual. Where
it is clearly shown that there was such bias in an administrative hear-
ing, the courts will not allow the results of the hearing to stand.56
In United States v. Peebles,57 for example, the defendant was con-
victed by the district court for failure to submit to induction into the
armed forces. He contended that the classification by his local draft
board was void, since there was bias shown on the part of the board.
Bias was evidenced by statements to the effect that he was using
political influence to stay out of the service. The court upheld this
contention and stated that the defendant had a right to a fair hearing,
and that it was deprived him by the biased board.
The Hoover Commission has not dealt specifically with the prob-
lem of bias, but the two Recommendations previously discussed 58
would seem to go a long way toward solving it. If the decision making
bodies of the agencies are insulated from the rest of the agency, as
suggested, prejudgment and coloring of views would be consid-
erably lessened. As stated in the Task Force Report, internal
separation of powers is ". . . an arrangement within an agency de-
signed to prevent the contamination of judging by other inconsistent
52 See DAvis, ADMINISTRAIVrE LAW § 112 (1951). "One of the prime pur-
poses behind the creation of many administrative agencies has been to escape
the bias of judges. By and large, with many exceptions, judges who have been
influenced by legal training toward conservative thought and who have been
accustomed as advocates at the bar to favoring interests of property tend to
be biased in favor of protection of private rights against governmental
interference." Id. §112, at 371.
53 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949) ; Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Montana Power Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 12 F. Supp. 946 (D. Mont. 1935).
54 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See, e.g., NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562 (5th
Cir. 1943); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1939).
55 See United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Berkshire
Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941); Montana Power Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 12 F. Supp. 946 (D. Mont. 1935).
56 See United States v. Peebles, supra note 55; Berkshire Knitting Mills v.
NLRB, supra note 55.
57 220 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1955).




functions." 59 One objective of the Commission would seem to be the
de-emphasis of identifying hearing personnel with the agency itself.
Other Considerations
There are certain other aspects of procedural due process which
should be mentioned. A recent Supreme Court case, United States
v. Nugent,60 dealt with the problem of the admission of ex parte evi-
dence. Petitioner, a conscientious objector, claimed that an F.B.I.
report, containing evidence adverse to him and used against him,
should have been open ,to his inspection. He further claimed that
because it was not, he was denied a fair hearing. The Court held that
the petitioner was entitled merely to a "fair resume" of the report and
that this procedure did not violate the fifth amendment. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion, stated that: "The very purpose
of a hearing is to give registrants an opportunity to meet adverse
evidence. It makes a mockery of that purpose to suggest that such
adverse evidence can be effectively met if its provenance is unknown.
Nor is it possible to be confident that a 'resume is fair' when one
cannot know what it is a resume of." 61 Usually, in adjudicatory
hearings, the principle of the "exclusiveness of the record" is appli-
cable. That is, the decision will be based solely on what is contained
in the hearing record.62 It is obvious that this principle was not
utilized.63 Even overlooking this violation of the "exclusiveness of
the record" rule, the contention of Justice Frankfurter poses an in-
surmountable block to an acceptance of the decision. It is difficult to
see how a hearing can be fair when adverse evidence is kept from the
party. The Hoover Commission Task Force recommends that when
a hearing is required "under the Constitution or by statute, the parties
should be entitled to a formal adjudicatory proceeding." 6 Section 5
of the Administrative Procedure Act defines formal adjudicatory pro-
ceedings 65 and sets forth certain requirements with which agencies
must comply in holding these hearings. It provides for a hearing "in
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing .. ." 66 In the
Nugent case, the hearing was required by statute to be determined on
59 Id. at 176 (emphasis added).60 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
61 United States v. Nugent, supra note 60 at 13. See ICC v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913). "... For manifestly there is no hearing when the
party does not know what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an
opportunity to test, explain, or refute." Id. at 93.62 See Schwartz, Administrative Law, 1953 ANx. SuRvEY Am. L. 101, 106-07,
29 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 101, 106-07 (1954).63 Id. at 107.64 TAsx FORCE RmORT 167 (Recommendation No. 37).65 60 STAT. 239, § 5 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
'6 Ibid.
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the record after an agency hearing.67 But such hearings are specifi-
cally exempted from the operation of the Administrative Procedure
Act by Section 13(b) of the Selective Service Act of 1948.68 The
Task Force Recommendation would do away with these exemptions
and require formal adjudicatory procedure in all hearings. Thus,
Section 5 would apply. Section 7(d), applicable by reference,69
states:
Where any agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not ap-
pearing in the evidence in the record, any party shall on timely request be
afforded an opportunity to show the contrary.70
Thus, the report relied upon in the Nugent case would have been
shown to the defendant, thereby eliminating any denial of due process
in this respect.
The Task Force sets forth another Recommendation pertinent to
procedural due process:
In adjudication . . . required under the Constitution or by statute to be made
after hearing, in which the agency has not presided at the reception of the
evidence, the presiding officer should prepare and file an initial decision.71
This would apply to all cases where hearing examiners preside at the
initial hearing; it is based upon the premise that the one who hears
the evidence is most fit to decide the case. 2 Today, in nine statutory
agency proceedings examiners merely prepare recommended decisions,
while in eleven initial decisions are submitted. 7  The difference lies
in the fact that recommended decisions are merely a record to guide
67 "Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service
because of such conscientious objections shall, if such claim is not sustained by
the local board, be entitled to an appeal to the appropriate appeal board. Upon
the filing of such appeal, the appeal board shall refer any such claim to the
Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing.... If after such hearing the
Department of Justice finds that his objections are not sustained, it shall rec-
ommend to the appeal board that such objections be not sustained. The appeal
board shall, in making its decision, give consideration to, but shall not be bound
to follow, the recommendation of the Department of Justice together with the
record on appeal from the local board." 62 STAT. 613 (1948), as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. §456(j) (1952).
6862 STAT. 623, 50 U.S.C. §463 (1948).
69 Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act states: "In hearings which
section 4 or 5 require to be conducted pursuant to this section .. " 60 STAT.
241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1952). Section 5(b) states: "The agency shall
afford all interested parties opportunity for . . . hearing, and decision upon
notice and in conformity with section 7 and 8." 60 STAT. 239-40 (1946).
5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952). Since Section 5 applies and requires these hearings
to be conducted pursuant to Section 7, Section 7 also applies. This, of course.
is in the absence of specific legislative exemption.
7060 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1952).
71 TASK FORCE REPORT 201 (Recommendation No. 48). This Recommenda-
tion was not adopted by the Commission.
72 See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
-3 See TAs FORCE REPORT 202.
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the agency and are not final. 74 An initial decision on the other hand,
is final, unless set aside by the agency on review.78 The Task Force
desires to make all decisions initial decisions in cases of ". . . adjudi-
cation ... required under the Constitution or by statute to be made
after hearing. . .. ,, 76 It is felt that due process demands that a fair
hearing be given, and a fair hearing is not given when the person
deciding the case initially has neither seen nor heard the witnesses.
77
Conclusion
There can be little doubt that despite the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, there are areas in administrative law where the individual's
rights are not fully protected. The Hoover Commission has proposed
what appears to be a concrete solution for many of these problems.
Although criticized,78 the Commission Report should not be dismissed
lightly, since it was prepared after months of study by eminently qual-
ified men. One criticism has been that it is an attempt to "judicialize"
administrative procedure.7 9 It is submitted that although the discussed
Recommendations do tend to judicialize procedure to a certain extent,
they are necessary to ensure protection of individual rights. It has
also been said that to put these Recommendations into effect would
entail heavy expenditures by the government.80 Assuming arguendo
that this is so, the economic purpose for which the administrative
process was established 8 1 would be thwarted by efforts to provide
procedural due process. Since it cannot be denied that the adminis-
trative process is here to stay, there is a choice between insuring
procedural due process or keeping expenses down. It is hoped that
the first alternative will be adopted. There are many, of course, who
feel that procedural due process is assured under the present system.82
74 Id. at 201.
,5 Ibid.
76 Ibid. (Recommendation No. 48).
77 See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) ; TASK FORcE REPORT
203.
78 See, e.g., Brownell, Views on Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports,
23 ICC PRAC. J. 195 (1955) ; Symposium: Hoover Commission and Task Force
Reports on Legal Services and Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1267 (1955).
79 See Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, in Symposium: Hoo7,er Commission
and Task Force Reports ot Legal Services and Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1273, 1296 (1955).
80 See Brownell, supra note 78, at 200.
81 See Schwartz, Administrative Justice, in Symposium: Hoover Commission
and Task Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1390, 1399 (1955). Mr. Schwartz also feels that the initial reasons for the
establishment of the administrative system are no longer valid. Id. at 1410-11.
Further, he feels that it would be almost impossible to transfer their functions
back to the courts, both politically and practically. Id. at 1411.
82 See, e.g., Brownell, Views on Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports,
23 ICC PRAC. J. 195, 198 (1955); LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 47
(1938).
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
From the preceding discussion, it can be seen that this is not always so.
Nevertheless, in a field so charged with political and economic impli-
cations, there is little hope that these Recommendations will soon
become law. It is submitted, however, that they should.
X
ARBITRATION AND UNANIMITY AGREEMENTS IN THE CLOSE
CORPORATION
The statutorily expressed public policy of New York favors
majority rule in corporations and the unhindered discretion of
directors.' Varied and repeated attempts have been made to circum-
vent this policy through the use of stockholder agreements. In
Manson v. Curtis,2 for example, the plaintiff permitted the defendant
to become the majority shareholder on condition that the plaintiff
continue to manage the corporation, with the directors as mere figure-
heads. This agreement was held invalid as violative of public policy
inasmuch as it created a sterile board of directors. However, the
unanimity agreement,3 a more moderate deviation from the statutory
norm, ultimately received legislative sanction.4 Some of the difficulties
1 "The business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors.
[A] majority of the board . . . shall be necessary to constitute a quorum
and the act of a majority ... shall be the act of the board." N.Y. GEN.
CORaP. LAW § 27. See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 117,
60 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1945).
2223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918). Later cases relaxed the rigid attitude
of the court in the Manson decision. In McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323,
189 N.E. 234 (1934), the plaintiff, a dismissed director, sought specific per-
formance of an agreement whereby the defendants were obligated to use their
best efforts to continue him as director and officer of the corporation. The
court held the agreement to be invalid because it destroyed the discretion of the
directors. Indicative of a liberal trend, however, was the concurring opinion
of Judge Lehman, maintaining that agreements to vote for one another were
valid even then. Two years later, in Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E.
641 (1936), an agreement to vote for the plaintiff as director and general man-
ager was upheld since there was no rigid public policy involved. In Matter of
Buckley, 183 Misc. 189, 50 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct. 1944), a by-law that pro-
hibited removal of the chairman of the board or president without cause was
upheld for the same reason. The court so held despite the fact that the cor-
poration was large and all the stockholders had never assented. See 45 COLUM.
L. REv. 960, 963 n.15 (1945). Prior to this case it was thought that unanimity
was essential for any deviation from the statutory norm.
3 By a requirement of unanimous concurrence for all actions of the cor-
poration, minority stockholders retain a veto power over the acts of the ma-
jority. See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., supra note 1; 1948 LEG. Doc.
No. 65(K), REPORT, N.Y. LAW RmISlON ColmmssioN 5 (1948).
4 N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 9. See also 1948 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), op. cit.
sapra note 3, at 5-9.
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